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REVIVAL JUDGMENTS UNDER THE FULL FAITH
AND CREDIT CLAUSE
Many state judiciaries have displayed a continuing resistance to the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the full faith and credit clause.' Their major objection
stems from that Court's insistence that a judgment of one state be given effect
in all sister states irrespective of the fact that the judgment could not have
been obtained in the state where enforcement is sought because inconsistent
with, or repugnant to, the public policy of that state.2 The only concession made
permits the forum to ignore foreign procedure and apply its own.
In the leading case of McElmoyle v. Coken,3 the Supreme Court classified the
problem of the applicability of the forum state's statute of limitations to foreign
judgments as one of procedure, since such judgments were said to affect only the
remedies of the foreign judgment holder.4 The forum could therefore apply its
own statute of limitations to deny enforcement of a foreign judgment although
the judgment would not be so barred in the state of its origin.
Relying on the McElmoyle doctrine, the Supreme Court of Missouri in Union
National Bank v. Lambs refused enforcement to the holder of a dormant 1927
Colorado judgment that had been revived by a '945 Colorado proceeding. The
denial was predicated on Missouri's ten-year statute of limitations, under which
a 1927 Missouri judgment could not have been revived in 1945. In reversing the
decision, the United States Supreme Court assumed that the Colorado revival
action resulted in a new judgment and was consequently entitled to fhll faith
and credit in Missouri.6 Justice Frankfurter dissented on the ground that, under
Colorado law, a revival proceeding possibly did not result in a new judgment,
but was effective only to extend the statutory period in which to enforce the
original 1927 Colorado judgment. In such a case the Missouri action would
clearly be barred by the Missouri statute of limitations.
But for stare decisis there seems little reason why the classification of prob-
lems of limitation under the McElmoyle rule should persist today. While it is
true that it would be cumbersome for a court to conform to all minute proce-
* U.S. Const. Art. 4, § I
*Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (igo8), where it was held that a Mississippi court had
not given full faith and credit to a Missouri judgment when it refused to enforce it because
based on a Mississippi gambling contract which was both void and illegal in that state. Aside
from the bar of the statute of limitations, the only defenses available in an action on a judg-
ment of a sister state are proof of "extrinsic" fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Concerning "ex-
trinsic" fraud, see Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107 (i89o). As to jurisdictional requirements
generally, see Milliken v. Meyer, 31i U.S. 454 (1940).
3 13 Pet. (U.S.) 312 (1839).
4 The Court partially based its decision upon the much broader rationale that state sover-
eignty provided courts the right to apply law in accordance with notions of policy existing in
the forum. 33 Pet. (U.S.) 312, 327 (1839). This argument has been clearly repudiated by the
United States Supreme Court in Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (I9o8).
s 358 Mo. 65, 213 S.W. 2d 416 (1948).
6 Union National Bank v. Lamb, 336 U.S. 9o (1949).
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dural devices of a foreign jurisdiction, the application of a foreign statute of
limitations does not present the same difficulty. Such statutes are easily estab-
lished and applied, whether of local or foreign origin. It is also difficult to con-
ceive how a right remains unaffected when a remedy is denied, unless one can
understand the language of "immortal" rights to bring "eternally prohibited"
actions.7 In view of continued Supreme Court pronouncements that judgments
of sister states must be given the same effect as they would receive within the
rendering jurisdiction, future modification or abandonment of the McElmoyle
rule would not be surprising.
Despite these criticisms of the rule and despite evident Supreme Court hos-
tility, local statutes of limitations have been constantly applied to bar actions
upon foreign judgments. The present case may be viewed as an attempt by the
Missouri court to extend such application. Two provisions of the Missouri limi-
tations statute are relevant. The first limited the life of a judgment, whether
domestic or foreign, to ten years after its original rendition or ten years after its
revival. The second provided that no judgment could be revived after ten years
from its rendition. If the 1945 Colorado revival judgment is considered a "new"
judgment, it is patent, of course, that it was well within the ten-year limitation
provided by the first provision and could not have been barred under the tradi-
tional application of the McElmoyle rule. However, the 1945 Colorado proceed-
ing was based on an eighteen year old judgment. Its revival under a twenty-year
Colorado revival limitation was plainly inconsistent with the policy of Missouri's
ten-year revival limitation contained in the second provision. In holding that
the 1945 revival judgment was unenforceable because the revival proceeding
would not have been possible under Missouri's ten-year limitation, the Missouri
court sought to extend the McElmoyle rule by construing it so as to bar an action
on a foreign judgment which was based on a cause of action which would have
been barred by local limitation. These examinations of the age of a cause of
action underlying the judgment sought to be enforced are of course violative of
the principle that the state where enforcement is sought cannot look behind the
judgment, and for this reason have been repeatedly struck down by the Supreme
Court.'
7Ames, Lectures and Legal History i99 (19 13). The traditional view of regarding problems
of limitations of actions as procedural is no longer regarded with favor. Its results are now
being avoided by a variety of devices, especially by borrowing statutes and by means of the
judge-made theory of regarding as "substantive" time limitations of the lex causae which
either "destroy" the right in question or are contained in a statute referring to a right which
is itself a statutory creation. See Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws 248
(i94o); Stumberg, Conflict of Laws '41 (1937); Limitations-Are They Properly Viewed as
Proceduralin Conflicts Problems, 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1112 (193i); also a comment by Perkins
to be published in the forthcoming issue of the La. L. Rev.
8 Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449 (1927) (Washington Supreme Court was reversed for
refusing to enforce an Oregon judgment which was based on a Washington judgment which
had been barred by the Washington statute of limitations); Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall.
(U.S.) 290 (i866) (Mississippi statute providing that no action could be maintained against a
resident on any judgment obtained outside the jurisdiction when the cause of action on which
it was based would have been barred by limitation in Mississippi, was held unconstitutional).
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Trite as the decision in the principal case may seem as an application of well-
known law, it is interesting from another standpoint. For brevity's sake assume
state F. to be the state rendering a revival judgment and state F. as the state in
which enforcement is sought; assume, furthermore, that the period of limita-
tions which F2 will apply to an action on judgments is shorter than the period
within which F. permits a judgment to be revived. Now if, as in the Union
National Bank case, Fy's revival judgment must be given full faith and credit in
F. despite the fact that F2's statute of limitations would have barred enforcement
of the original F, judgment at the time of revival, it is apparent that the effect of
the F1 revival is to set a new period of limitations running in all possible F,
jurisdictions. Thus an F. judgment creditor may avoid the traditional McEl-
moyle rule by first obtaining a revival judgment in F.
There are, however, two prerequisite conditions which must exist before the
holder of an F. judgment can be successful in such an avoidance. The first is
dependent upon the F. jurisdiction's conception of a revival judgment. This is
so because, before the F. revival can be considered to toll the running of a new
statute of limitations in F. jurisdictions, it must appear that F. conceived of its
revival judgment as a "new" judgment, rather than one which merely extended
the statutory period in which the creditor would be allowed to enforce his
original judgment. If the revival judgment merely extends the statutory period
of limitation in F, it will have no effect in extending F2's period and the
McEtnoyle rule permitting application of the local F. limitation remains a bar.9
However, if the F. revival has those attributes which cause it to be considered a
"new" judgment, the rule of the principal case insists on full faith and credit in
F.'s courts despite F2's statute.
Thus there arises the question of determining when a revival constitutes a
"new" judgment and when it merely gives the original judgment a "new lease
on life." The answer depends on which one or more of the four more common
procedural devices are permitted by the F, jurisdiction, and which of these
devices are chosen by the judgment holder. The two traditional means are the
writ of scire facias and the action of debt. Statutes also allow revival either by
motion or by formal suit.
(i) In a number of states the writ of scirefacias disappeared with the advent
of the codes; but where it continues to exist it serves its old purpose though
not always with the same effect. Historically the writ was not regarded as an
original proceeding but as an additional remedy to aid in recovering the original
judgment debt. ° If the debtor failed to show payment or discharge, the writ's
9 Owens v. Henry, 161 U.S. 642 (1896); Collins County National Bank v. Hughes, 11o
Tex. 362, 220 S.W. 767 (1920).
xo See LaFayette v. Wonderly, 92 Fed. 313 (I899); 3 B1. Comm. *421; Freeman, A Treatise
of the Law of Judgments § iO9i (X925). The writ of scire facias had its origin in the Statute of
Westminster II, x3 Ed. I, c. 45 (1272), which provided that the issuance of the writ was
necessary to permit an execution on a judgment which had stood for more than a year and a
day. It has been adopted in the United States either by statute or as part of the common law.
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effect was to reinstate the old judgment.- In accordance with the historical
pattern, most jurisdictions consider the proceeding as a continuation of a
former suit.12 Some, however, treat it as a new action giving rise to a "new"
judgment.'3 (2) The action of debt brought on the original judgment, on the
other hand, has always been considered an initial proceeding giving rise to a
"new" judgment. Though its primary and traditional purpose was the collection
of the debt evidenced by the judgment, it also was used as a means of revival.
Under the codes, actions in the nature of an action of debt can still be brought
for revival purposes,!4 and in some jurisdictions this means of revival is ex-
pressly authorized by statute.'s (3) In other jurisdictions revival may be had
upon motion before the court, but the judgment debtor must be given reason-
able notice and an opportunity to offer such defenses as payment or discharge. 6
The general rules of procedure on motions are held to apply and the effect is
merely to reinstate the enforceability of the old judgment. 7 (4) Either in addi-
tion to or in exclusion of these various methods, many states provide for revival
by a formal suit for that purpose, similar to any other action at law and subject
to the same requirements. 8 The proceedings have been considered to result in a
new and independent judgment in some jurisdictions, while in others their effect
is merely to reinstate the original judgment.
However, the classification of these various types of revival judgments is not
always so clear as is indicated by Justice Frankfurter's dissent in the principal
case. Since the problem is of little importance when the revival judgment is
sought to be enforced in F! the matter is seldom discussed. Often an answer must
be surmised from an occasional dictum in some decision. Another interesting
question is whether the classification given by F! courts is binding upon those of
F2, or whether the courts of F2 can make an independent examination. F. deci-
sions in similar situations have not always been accepted in foreign jurisdic-
tions.19 Although the problem was not raised, the opinions in the Union National
- See LaFayette v. Wonderly, 92 Fed. 313 (1899); Freeman, A Treatise of the Law of
Judgments § 1Ogi (1925).
2 Trustees of Schools v. Chamberlin, 3 3 4 Ill. App. 83, 78 N.E. 2d525 (x948); Collins County
National Bank v. Hughes, io Tex. 362, 220 S.W. 767 (1920); Freeman, A Treatise of the Law
of Judgments § 1091 (1925); see Annotation, x44 A.L.R. 403 (1943).
13 Browne v. Chavez, x8i U.S. 68 (i9oo); Freeman, A Treatise of the Law of Judgments
§ IIO (1925).
X4 Industrial National Bank v. Shalin, 330 Ill. App. 498, 72 N.E. 2d 52 (i947).
'SFo example, see Tex. Ann. Rev. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1941) art. 5532.
16 Richardson v. Barnhart, 196 Okla. 10o, 162 P. 2d 1021 (z945); Shefts v. Oklahoma Co.,
X92 Okla. 483, 137 P. 2d 589 (1943).
X7 Shefts v. Oklahoma Co., 192 Okla. 483, 137 P. 2d 589 (1943).
is Trustees of Schools v. Chamberlin, 334 Ill. App. 83, 78 N.E. 2d 525 (1948); Tingwall v.
King Hill Irrigation Dist., 66 Idaho 77, 155 P. 2d 6o5 (1945); Ill. Rev. Stat. (i949) c. iio,
§ 179.
19 Compare McArthur v. Md. Casualty Co., 184 Miss. 663, 690, I86 So. 305, 310 (i939),
dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Smith; see also x Rabel, Conflict of Laws 47 (I945).
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Bank case obviously proceed on the basis that an F determination is conclu-
sive.
The second prerequisite for enforcement of the "revived" judgment in an-
other state is that the court entertaining the revival action must be able to
obtain jurisdiction over the defendant. If the proceeding is a new action and its
purpose is to obtain a new personal judgment against the defendant, the require-
ments of due process are the same as in any other action in personam. 20 A judg-
ment which requires enforcement outside the state in which it was rendered
normally involves a nonresident, and a judgment creditor will, therefore, be
forced to wait until the defendant makes an appearance within the jurisdiction.
In the Union National Bank case the defendant was served with process outside
of Colorado. Since such notification is said to be no more effective than service
by publication,2 it would appear that the Missouri court could have avoided
reversal by placing its decision on the ground that the Colorado court granting
the revival judgment failed to acquire jurisdiction over the defendant, assuming
that at the time the revival proceedings were commenced, the defendant was
not a domiciliary of Colorado.22 Where, however, the proceeding is considered to
be a mere continuation of the former suit which does not result in a new judg-
ment, personal service within the reviving jurisdiction is not required, since
jurisdiction over the parties is said to continue from the original action.23
It would be unfortunate if it became settled law that a judgment creditor's
rights must hinge upon a distinction between "new" and "continued" actions
which has resulted from purely formalistic tests and has been elaborated for
purposes different from that of determining whether or not a "stale" judgment
shall be enforced in another state. Either the much criticized McElmoyle case
should be overruled and all revived foreign judgments should be required to be
given the same effect as they would receive in F, or the courts of F2 should be
allowed to refuse enforcement to any revival judgment once the original judg-
ment on which it was based is barred by the F, statute of limitations. Inasmuch
as the rule of the McElmoyle case is already subject to a great number of excep-
tions and in view of the present trend toward giving the full faith and credit
clause a more meaningful interpretation, the first alternative would appear
more desirable. Either solution would be preferable to that which seems to
follow from the principal case and which makes F.'s duty of enforcement depend
upon the historical accident of the "new" and "continued" judgment distinction
and upon the fortuitous choice of revival procedure adopted by the judgment
20 Owens v. Henry, x6r U.S. 642 (1896); Collins County National Bank v. Hughes, ixo
Tex. 362, 220 S.W. 767 (1920).
2" Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 (1899). By statute in Illinois, notification outside the state
is given the same force and effect as service by publication. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. iro, § 140.
.1 MAilliken v. Meyer, 3xi U.S. 454 (1940).
23 Bank of Edwardsville v. Raffaelle, 381 Ill. 486, 45 N.E. 2d 651 (1942). For a collection
of authorities on this point, see Annotation, 144 A.L.R. 4o3 (94,3).
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creditor. Whichever solution will finally be chosen, care ought to be taken that
no revival judgment be enforced unless the judgment debtor was sought to be
informed of the revival proceedings in a manner reasonably calculated to notify
him of the pending proceedings.
THE SEARCH FOR "REASON AND EXPERIENCE" UNDER
THE FUNK DOCTRINE
"[A] wife cannot be produced either against or for her husband, 'quia sunt
duae animae in came una.' , So spoke Coke of the common-law principle.
"[T]here is none now so poor as to do it reverence." So spoke Judge Clark of the
same principle in United States v. Walker.2 But his was the dissent, and the ma-
jority opinion by Judge Learned Hand upheld one-half the principle, though not
the Latin, so that it was reversible error to allow a wife to testify against her
husband.
Walker was convicted of transporting in interstate commerce money "taken
feloniously by fraud with intent to steal or purloin."3 After having gone through
the form of marrying the complainant, one Mary Asche, when he was already
married to another, he obtained two large sums of money from her and ab-
sconded to New York. On previous occasions he had victimized his wife and
another woman in much the same manner, and the trial court admitted the tes-
timony of these two ladies on the issue of Walker's fraudulent intent in the crime
charged. In reversing the district court, Judge Hand retained the common-law
rule that the husband has a privilege to prevent his wife from testifying against
him.4 Hand felt that before this rule be overthrown, the court must "await the
choice of Congress between the conflicting interests involved, or such an over-
wheiming general acceptance by the states of abolition of the privilege, as in-
duced the Supreme Court to action in Funk v. United States."s Judge Clark, dis-
senting vigorously, called for the abolition of the privilege as accomplished by
another federal court of appeals. 6 Even more emphatically did he denounce the
majority's refusal to broaden the common-law doctrine of "necessity," a doc-
trine which permitted a wife who had suffered personal wrongs at her husband's
hands to testify against him. Clark saw reason as requiring the extension of this
exception to the case where the wife, though not the actual complainant, is yet
desirous of testifying to a "Chinese copy" of the offense charged. He felt the
majority had not faced modern realities in the spirit invoked in the Funk case
-Co. Litt. *6b.
2 176 F. 2d 564, 569 (C.A. 2d, 1949), cert. den. 338 U.S. 89i (i949).
348 Stat. 794 (1934) and 53 Stat. 1178 (I939), 18 U.S.C.A. § 415 (Supp. 1948), revised
62 Stat. 862 (1948), i8 U.S.C.A. § 2314 (1948).
4 8 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2227-28 (1940).
s United States v. Walker, note 2 supra, at 568.
6 Yoder v. United States, So F. 2d 665 (C.C.A. zoth, 1935).
